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The Corporate Income Tax and the
Competitiveness of U.S. Industries
MICHAEL S. KNOLL*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. auto industry was hit hard by the financial crisis and recession that began in 2008. In 2009, it came to Washington, D.C., hat in
hand, to ask Congress for a multi-billion dollar bailout.l Without that
support, industry spokesmen said that one or more of the Big 3-General Motors (GM), Ford, and Chrysler-might not make it through
2009. 2 The industry received billions from Congress and they are still
building and selling cars, although not as many as before the
recession. 3
Many reasons have been given for the U.S. auto industry's lack of
competitiveness, including the U.S. tax system, especially the high
U.S. corporate income tax rate. 4 In comparison with our trading partners, the United States has a relatively high statutory corporate income tax rate. Among the thirty members of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United

* Theodore K. Warner Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Professor of
Real Estate, Wharton School; Co-director, Center for Tax Law and Policy, University of
Pennsylvania. I thank Edward Kleinbard for comments and suggestions and Alvin Dong
and Benjamin Meltzer for assistance with the research. I have received no funding for this
project from sources outside of the University of Pennsylvania and Columbia University
(where I was a visiting professor during part of the time I was working on this Article).
I Dee DePass, Manufacturers Step on the Brakes; Producers Say the Recession Has
Knocked Their Wheels Off, and the Nearest Tow Is at Least a Year Away, Op.-Ed., Star
Trib. (Minneapolis), Dec. 9, 2008, at 2D; Thomas H. Trimarco, The Big Three: When Will
They Ever Learn?, The Boston Globe, Dec. 10, 2008, at A23.
2 Ken Bensinger & Jim Puzzanghera, GM Raises the Stakes, Vows Cuts: The Carmaker
Warns of Year-End Collapse as the Big 3 Submit Plans to Restructure and Seek Billions
More from U.S., L.A. Times, Dec. 3, 2008, at A1; Sharon Silke Carty, Automakers Ask for
Billions in Loans, Credit; 1\vo Say They're Nearly Out of Money, USA Today, Dec. 3,
2008, at lB.
3 See Bill Vlasic, Detroit Goes from Gloom to Economic Bright Spot, N.Y. Times, Aug.
14, 2010, at A1; Nick Bunkley & Bill Vlasic, General Motors Files for an Initial Public
Offering, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 2010, at B1; David Shepardson, Obama Wants a Bank Tax
to Recoup Funds, Detroit News, Jan. 15, 2010, at B6; Timothy F. Geithner, Op.-Ed., Welcome to the Recovery, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 2010, at A23.
4 William McGurn, What's Good for GM Could Be Good for America, Wall St. J., Dec.
2, 2008, at A17 (stating that taxes and health-care expenses make U.S. companies less
competitive); see IRC § 11 (35% federal statutory corporate income tax rate on incomes
over $18,333,333).
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States has the second highest statutory corporate income tax rate after
Japan. 5
Not surprisingly, business interests have long sought lower corporate tax rates, claiming that lower rates will improve U.S. competitiveness.6 Although the argument that the high U.S. corporate income tax
rate hurts competitiveness resonates around the country and across
party lines, 7 there seems to have been little serious attention devoted
to understanding the mechanism(s) through which the corporate income tax reduces the competitiveness of U.S. corporations.
The most likely explanation for such a gap is that economists (many
of whom have studied the corporate income tax) generally eschew
talk of competitiveness, because "competitiveness" is not a precisely
defined term in economics. 8 Yet, the public dialogue about taxes is
filled with talk of competitiveness. 9 My purpose in this Article is to
bridge the gap between economic scholarship and public discourse by
explaining how the corporate income tax affects competitiveness. Although I use the U.S. auto industry as an example, the analysis and
5 Tax Found., Tax Data: OECD Nations Continue Cutting Corporate Tax Rates While
U.S. Stands Still: Federal Plus ProvinciaUState Corporate Tax Rates for OECD Countries,
2007 and. 2008 (2008), http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/corptaxrates_oecd_change20072008-20080813.pdf (including state and provincial taxes, the combined tax rate in Japan
was 39.54% in 2008, whereas the combined tax rate in the United States is 39.25%). Although U.S. corporate tax rates are high relative to the rest of the world, the corporate
income tax accounts for an ever decreasing portion of federal revenues. For decades, corporate tax revenues as a share of total tax revenues have been declining. See Budget of the
United States, Historical Tables 32 (2008), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omblbudget/fy2009/
pdUhist.pdf (Table 2.2-Percentage Composition of Receipts by Source: 1934-2013). Although the top statutory U.S. corporate tax rate is 35%, the average tax rate (the total paid
as a share of total income) is much lower, around 24%. See Ryan J. Donmoyer & Peter
Cook, Rangel Plans Push to Cut Top Corporate Tax Rate to 28%, Bloomberg.com, Nov.
15, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid;,newsarchive&sid=AG71SuB.yyll.
However, low effective tax rates combined with high marginal tax rates cannot be ideal
because such taxes raise little revenue, but create large distortions.
6 See Peggy Brewer Richman, The Taxation of Foreign Investment Income: An Economic Analysis 4-10 (1963); Peggy B. Musgrave, United States Taxation of Foreign Investment Income 119 (1969).
7 In 2008, Rep. Charles Rangel (D-NY), at the time the chairman of the House Ways
and Means Committee, called for cutting the top corporate income tax rate from 35% to
28% in order to improve the competitiveness of U.S. corporations. Donmoyer & Cook,
note 5 (referring to a study by Ernst & Young that found U.S. corporations paid tax at an
average effective rate of 23.7%). During the 2008 presidential campaign, candidate Barack
Obama signaled his openness to such a reduction. See Nelson D. Schwartz & Steve Lohr,
Looking for Swing Votes in the Boardroom, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 2008, at BUl.
s See Samuel Brittan, "Competitiveness" Rears its Ugly Head, Fin. Times (London),
Aug. 31, 2007, at 11 (discussing how politicians, business leaders, and even economists use
the term "competitiveness" indiscriminately).
9 See Edmund L. Andrews, Paulson Says U.S. Is Hurt by High Tax Rates, N.Y. Times,
July 25, 2007, at C5; C. Fred Bergsten, Editorial, A Clear Route to Recovery: Exports,
Wash. Post, Feb. 3, 2010, at A15; Newt Gingrich & Dan Varroney, Hoping for Change:
Americans Still Need Jobs, Chi. Trib., July 13, 2010, at C15.
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conclusions are general. They apply to other industries and even to
other countries that have a classic corporate income tax. 10
This Article proceeds as follows.U I begin the next Part by describing what it means for an industry to be domestic and then I describe
what it means for a domestic industry to be competitive. I show that
there are two different definitions for the domestic industry in general
use and that each definition is associated with a different notion of
competitiveness. In Parts III and IV, I show that the mechanism
through which the corporate income tax affects competitiveness differs depending upon how the domestic industry is defined. In Part V,
I provide a diagrammatic representation of the results presented in
Parts III and IV. Part VI concludes.
II.

DEFINING "CoMPETITIVENEss" AND "A DoMESTIC INDUSTRY"

Competitiveness is an often used, but rarely defined term.12 It has
been called a dangerous obsession 13 and the hot-button issue in debates over international tax policy,14 yet it lacks a clear and specific
meaning. Competitiveness can mean different things to different people and at different times. It also can apply at different levels of the
economy. Competitiveness is sometimes said to be a characteristic of
10 A classic corporate income tax is one where the corporate income tax is separate and
apart from the individual income tax. In addition, although this is not always part of the
definition of a classic corporate income tax, but it is important to generate the results
described below, foreign corporate taxes do not generate foreign tax credits for the individual investors, who are the ultimate owners.
11 This Article is part of a larger project on taxes and competitiveness. The first paper in
that series is MichaelS. Knoll, Taxes and Competitiveness (U. of Penn., Inst. for Law &
Econ., Research Paper No. 06-28, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.cornfsol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=953074 [hereinafter Taxes and Competitiveness]. Other papers in theseries include: Michael S. Knoll, Taxation and the Competitiveness of Sovereign Wealth
Funds: Do Taxes Encourage Sovereign Wealth Funds to Invest in the United States?, 82 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 703 (2009) [hereinafter Sovereign Wealth Funds]; Michael S. Knoll, The
UBIT: Leveling an Uneven Playing Field or Tilting a Level One?, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 857
(2007) [hereinafter UBIT]; Michael S. Knoll, International Competitiveness, Tax Incentives, and a New Argument for Tax Sparing: Preventing Double Taxation by Crediting
Implicit Taxes (U. of Penn., lnst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 08-21, 2008),
available at http://papers.ssrn.cornfsol3/papers.efm?abstract_id=1259927 [hereinafter Tax
Sparing]; Michael S. Knoll, Business Taxes and International Competitiveness: Understanding How Taxes Can Distort Ownership and Designing a Nondistortive International
Tax System, in Dimensions of Competitiveness 207 (Paul De Grauwe, ed. 2010); Michael S.
Knoll, Reconsidering International Tax Neutrality (U. of Penn., Inst. for Law & Econ.,
Research Paper No. 09-16, 2009), available at http:l/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1407198 [hereinafter Reconsidering].
t2 See Paul Krugman, Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession, Foreign Affairs, Mar.Apr. 1994, at 28.
13 ld.
14 Daniel N. Shaviro, Decoding the U.S. Corporate Tax 133 (2009).

774

TAX LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:

firms, of industries, or even of entire countries.15 It has the most familiar ring when it applies to industries or sectors, as in the phrase
"the competitiveness of the U.S. auto industry." Accordingly,
throughout this Article, I use the term "competitiveness" as a characteristic of a national industry.
Before I talk further about "competitiveness," however, I discuss
what it means for an industry to be a national industry. Politicians, the
press, and commentators often speak of the "U.S. auto industry" without being clear what they mean. 16 There are at least two alternative
definitions for the "U.S. auto industry."
Under the most colloquial and frequently used sense of the term,
the U.S. auto industry is the U.S.-based and U.S.-incorporated automobile companies-the Big 3. The operations of the Big 3 are not
confined to the United States. They are multinational corporations
(MNCs) with operations in many countriesP Under this definition,
the U.S. auto industry comprises the global output of the Big 3
automakers. 18
Under a second definition, the U.S. auto industry is the total production of automobiles in the United States without regard to the nationality of the producing company.l 9 The U.S. auto industry, then, is
the total output of automobiles in the United States by U.S.- and foreign-based automakers.
Figure 1 illustrates these two definitions of the U.S. auto industry.
The first definition (total auto production by U.S.-based automakers)
15 For a thoughtful review of the literature on competitiveness with an emphasis on the
wide range of different definitions employed in the literature, see Eckhard Siggel, International Competitiveness and Comparative Advantage: A Survey and a Proposal for Measurement, 6 J. Indus. Competition & Trade 137, 140-48 (2006).
16 See, e.g., Michael Brocker, German Makes Continue to Surge in U.S. Auto Market,
Philadelphia Inquirer, Aug. 12, 2010, at COl; Michael Hiltzik, Dealers Need a Co-Signer:
Congress, L.A. Times, July 16,2009, at Bl; Jerry Hirsch, Carmakers Ramping Up RanksU.S. Auto Industry Expects Growth in Home Construction and, Therefore, Vehicle Sales,
Chi. Trib., Jan. 19, 2010, at 19; Nelson D. Schwartz, World Leaders Wary of U.S. Economic
Measures, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 2009, at B6; David Shepardson, Obama Applauds U.S. Auto
Industry, Detroit News, Aug. 6, 2010, at A17; Peter Whoriskey, At Detroit Auto Show,
Washington Gets Close-Up Look at its Investment-Pelosi Applauds New Product Lines,
Industry "Renaissance," Wash. Post, Jan. 12, 2010, at Al2.
17 Although their overseas operations have been contracting, the Big 3 are all still
MNCs. See Heather Timmons, In Overhaul, G.M. May Look to its Far-Flung Arms, N.Y.
Times, June 4, 2009, at B4; Editorial, So Far So Good, N.Y. Times, May 18, 2009, at A22;
Bill Vlasic, G.M. Is to Sell Hummer to a Chinese Company, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 2009, at
B7.
1s Many cars sold in the United States, whether they bear a U.S. or foreign nameplate,
are made partly in the United States and partly abroad. Ashley Fantz, What Makes a Car
American?, CNN.com, Dec. 12, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/12/12/american.cars/.
19 See Robert B. Reich, Who Is Us? Harv. Bus. Rev. Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 53, 53-64. For
a critique of Reich's analysis, see Laura D'Andrea TYson, They Are not Us: Why American Ownership Still Matters, Am. Prospect 37 (Winter 1991).
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is given by the shade-d rectangle entitled Big 3 Auto Production. The
second definition is represented by the rectangle entitled U.S. auto
production and marked by hash marks.
FIGURE

Two

DEFINITIONS oF THE

1

U.S.

AuTo INDUSTRY

Non- U.S.
Auto Production

As is clear from Figure 1, there are two major differences between
the two definitions of the U.S. auto industry. The first definition (total global production of U.S. automakers) includes the foreign production of the Big 3 within the U.S. auto industry, which the second
definition (total auto production in the United States by all
automakers) excludes (the shaded rectangle and without hash marks).
The second definition includes the U.S. production of foreign
automakers, such as Toyota, BMW and Kia, within the scope of the
U.S. auto industry, which the first definition excludes (the unshaded
rectangle with hash marks). 2 o
2o Foreign-based auto companies now produce more than half of the cars that Americans buy, with many of those cars produced in whole or part within the United States.
Editorial, America's Other Auto Industry, Wall St. J., Dec. 1, 2008, at A22. Under the
location-based definition of the U.S. auto industry, a car produced in part in the United
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Neither definition of the U.S. auto industry is right or wrong. Both
are plausible definitions of that industry and both definitions are in
regular use. 21 For the purpose of this Article, what is significant about
the two definitions of the U.S. auto industry is that the impact of the
corporate income tax on the competitiveness of the U.S. auto industry
and the mechanism through which that effect occurs depends on how
the U.S. auto industry is defined. 22
That brings us to the search for a definition for "competitiveness."
A plausible broad working definition of competitiveness is as follows:
An industry is competitive if it can attract large amounts of capital
and labor at attractive rates and can combine that capital and labor
efficiently into a product that it can (profitably? 23 ) sell at the market
price. Using such a broad definition, it is obvious that many factors go
into making an industry competitive, including a well-educated and
highly productive work force, access to advanced technology, a solid
command of manufacturing techniques, a committed and efficient
management, the ability to attract capital at low cost, good labor-management relations, and savvy marketing. Many of those factors, however, are either unrelated to or are only tangentially related to
taxation. One factor that is directly affected by taxation is an industry's ability to attract capital at favorable rates. Thus, in order to understand how the corporate income tax affects the competitiveness of
the U.S. auto industry we need to answer the following narrower
question: What effect does the corporate income tax have on the ability of the U.S. auto industry to raise capital? The answer to that question depends in part on which definition of the U.S. auto industry is
used. 24
Under the first definition, the U.S. auto industry is defined as the
global operations of the Big 3 automakers. Viewed from such a perStates and in part elsewhere is the product of more than one auto industry. In effect, the
value added in each country is the output of each national industry. For expositional purposes, I largely ignore complications that arise when automakers produce a car in two or
more countries. I also ignore the role of independent suppliers.
21 See id.
22 The analysis and discussion that follow assume that the Big 3 would pay U.S. corporate income tax on any future income. These three companies have reported staggering
losses over the years. See, e.g., Zachery Kouwe & Louise Story, Big Three's Troubles May
Touch Financial Sector, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24,2008, at Bl; Matthew Dolan, John D. Stoll &
Joshua Mitchell, Auto-Industry Crisis, Job Losses Test Obama, Wall St. J., Nov. 8, 2008, at
Al. Any income earned for many years would not be taxed until those loss carryforwards
were used or expired. See IRC § 172. In effect, the Big 3 are tax-exempt. However, they
might not have been viewed as effectively tax-exempt when they raised funds and made
investments.
23 See note 22.
24 Thus, this Article does not look at how taxation can affect competitiveness through
other routes, such as through the accumulation of knowledge or through the labor market.
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spective, the U.S. auto industry competes with other national auto industries where each nation's industry is constituted by the automakers
based in that country. Thus, the Japanese auto industry is the global
production of Toyota, Nissan, Honda, and the other car companies
based in Japan. Similarly, the German auto industry is the global production of Volkswagen, Mercedes-Benz, and the other car companies
based in Germany. Those industries compete with one another globally and locally. For example, U.S., Japanese, and German auto companies compete with one another to produce and sell cars around the
world and in specific markets, including the United States. Thus, the
first definition of a domestic industry focuses on ownership. Under
that definition, the U.S. auto industry comprises all of the productive
assets owned by U.S.-based auto companies whether in the United
States or elsewhere. 25
Because the first definition of the U.S. auto industry focuses on the
nationality of the company that sells the car, not where the car is produced, the competition between U.S., Japanese, and German auto
companies can be visualized as competition to acquire control over
productive assets located in different locations.26 Under this view, the
various national auto industries compete, for example, to own an auto
plant in Canada. Viewed from such a perspective, a national industry
is more competitive than its rivals if it acquires the Canadian plant.
Taxation, then, affects competitiveness through its impact on the ownership of productive assetsP Thus, the U.S. corporate income tax will
adversely affect the competitiveness of the U.S. automotive industry if
it reduces the incentive for the Big 3-relative to their foreign competitors-to own automobile-producing assets. 28 If the corporate income tax discourages U.S. firms from owning automotive assets, then
25 The implicit assumption that a company has a nationality that can be identified is not
without controversy. See note 31.
26 Competition over where cars are produced falls under the second definition.
n See Knoll, Sovereign Wealth Funds, note 11, at 7-9.
28 Viewed from such a perspective, competitiveness bears a familiarity to the notion of
capital ownership neutrality, which is closely associated with the work of Mihir Desai and
James Hines. See Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Jr., Evaluating International Tax
Reform, 56 Nat'l Tax J. 487 (2003); Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Jr., Old Rules and
New Realities: Corporate Tax Policy in a Global Setting, 57 Nat'l Tax J. 937 (2004); Mihir
A. Desai, New Foundations for Taxing Multinational Corporations, 82 Taxes, Mar. 2004, at
39. The term capital ownership neutrality was coined by Michael Devereux in an unpublished working paper. See Michael P. Devereux, Capital Export Neutrality, Capital Import
Neutrality, Capital Ownership Neutrality, and All That (Inst. for Fisc. Stud. 1990)(unpublished manuscript on file with the author). It is also similar to the notion of capital import
neutrality as originally described by Peggy Musgrave. See Richman, note 6, at 8; Musgrave, note 6, at 119. For the argument that capital import neutrality has been and still
regularly is used in two inconsistent ways, one of which is closely related to capital ownership neutrality, see Knoll, Reconsidering, note 11.
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the corporate income tax directly reduces the competitiveness of the
U.S. auto industry; otherwise, it does not.
Under the second definition, the U.S. auto industry is defined as the
production of automobiles within the United States without regard to
the nationality of the producing firms. The U.S. auto industry, then,
includes the domestic production of the Big 3 as well as the U.S. production of foreign automobile makes and models. Viewed from such
a perspective, the U.S. auto industry competes with foreign auto industries where each national industry is defined by the auto production occurring within that country regardless of the nation in which
the firms that conduct those activities are based. For example, the
German auto industry comprises the production of cars in Germany,
including the domestic production of German car companies and the
German production of non-German nameplates, including that of the
Big 3 and the Japanese carmakers. Thus, the second definition of a
domestic industry focuses on the location of assets. Under that definition, the U.S. auto industry comprises all automobile-producing assets
located in the United States.
Viewed from this perspective, the competition that takes place between the U.S., German, and Japanese auto industries takes the form
of competition to produce more cars within each country. Because
auto production is a highly capital-intensive activity, that competition
takes the form of competing to attract capital. 29 The corporate income tax, then, affects competition through its impact on investment
in auto production in different countries. 30 Thus, the U.S. corporate
income tax reduces the competitiveness of the U.S. automobile industry if it discourages investment in automobile production in the
United States relative to investment in such production abroad. If the
U.S. corporate income tax discourages production in the United
States, then it directly reduces the competitiveness of the U.S. auto
industry; otherwise, it does not.
In the next two Parts, I examine the impact of the corporate income
tax on the U.S. auto industry under the two different notions of the
competitiveness of the industry described above. For each definition
of the U.S. auto industry, I describe how the corporate income tax
directly affects competitiveness. In each case, I describe the mechanics through which that effect occurs and under what circumstances it
occurs.
29 The competition for capital is usually visualized as being for private capital, not government financing. Government financing at nonmarket terms is appropriately excluded
from the analysis because it is at most tangentially connected to the corporate income tax.
30 Viewed from such a perspective, competitiveness is similar to the notion of capital
export neutrality. See Knoll, Reconsidering, note 11, at 16-20.
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TAXES AND CoMPETITIVENEss OF DoMESTICALLY-BASED MNCs

In the last Part, I described two alternative ways of defining a domestic industry-the global production of domestically-based producers31 and the domestic production of all producers regardless of where
they are based. In that Part, I also described the link between the
corporate income tax and the competitiveness of the domestic industry under each definition. Under the first definition, the corporate
income tax hurts competitiveness if it discourages investment by domestically-based firms relative to foreign-based firms. Thus, the first
definition focuses on the ownership of assets. Under the second definition, the corporate income tax hurts competitiveness if it discourages investment in the taxing country relative to investment abroad.
Thus, the second definition focuses on the location of investment. In
this Part, I assess the impact of the corporate income tax on the ownership of automotive assets by domestically-based and foreign-based
corporations. In the next Part, I look at the impact of the corporate
income tax on the location of that investment.
Under the first definition, the U.S. auto industry comprises the
global production of U.S.-based automakers-the Big 3. Taxation affects the competitiveness of that industry by influencing whether the
U.S. auto industry or its foreign rivals own specific assets. The impact
of taxation on the ownership of assets depends upon whether the competition is among entities that raise the capital they invest from investors or among investors who invest their own capital. When the
competition takes place among investors, each investor compares the
after-tax rate of return on alternative investments to the after-tax rate
of return on the investment under consideration.32 An investor is at a
31 In which jurisdiction a firm is based is not always an easy question to answer unambiguously. Under U.S. tax rules, a corporation's home is the state where it is incorporated.
IRC § 7701(a)(4), (5). Many other countries use a facts-and-circumstances approach to
determine a corporation's home for tax purposes. Such an approach makes tax planning
more difficult, and it does not always yield clear answers. See generally Mitchell Kane &
Edward Rock, Corporate Taxation and International Charter Competition, 106 Mich. L.
Rev. 1229 (2008).
32 One way to view the difference between entities and investors is that entities specialize in their investments whereas investors tend to hold diversified portfolios so as to reduce
risk. Accordingly, when assets are differentially taxed, investors trade off risk and return.
The after-tax capital asset pricing model (CAPM) describes how differential taxes across
assets and investors affect portfolio choices. The after-tax CAPM was first described by
Michael Brennan. M.J. Brennan, Taxes, Market Valuation and Corporate Financial Policy,
23 Nat'! Tax J. 417 (1970). It was subsequently expanded and applied by, among others,
David Bradford, Roger Gordon, David Guenther, and Richard Sansing. Roger H. Gordon
& David F. Bradford, Taxation and the Stock Market Valuation of Capital Gains and Dividends, 14 J. Pub. Econ. 109 (1980); David A. Guenther & Richard Sansing, The Effect of
Tax-Exempt Investors and Risk on Stock Ownership and Expected Returns (2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). It was first used to study international tax
policy by Mihir Desai and Dhammika Dharmapala. Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika
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tax-induced disadvantage only when the ratio of the investor's aftertax rate of return for the investment under consideration to the same
investor's after-tax rate of return on alternative investments is below
that same ratio for competing investors. It thus follows, that an investor is not at a tax-induced disadvantage in the competition to acquire
a specific asset simply because that investor is taxed more haevily than
his competitors on the income from that asset. Instead, the first investor is only at a tax disadvantage if he is taxed more heavily than his
rivals on the investment relative to alternative investments (commonly called the benchmark asset or benchmark portfolio ).33
When, however, the competition takes place among entities that
raise capital to invest-as opposed to investors who allocate their own
investment capital-tax considerations favor investing through the
lowest-taxed entity. 34 When an investment is made through a highlytaxed entity, a higher tax burden is imposed on that investment than
when the investment is made through a lightly-taxed entity. That is to
say, when the competition is among entities, absolute levels of taxation determine which entity has a tax-induced advantage in competitiveness. (In contrast, when the competition is across investors,
relative levels of taxation determine who has a tax-induced advantage.) Thus, the competition among corporations to acquire assets depends upon absolute as opposed to relative tax rates.
From a tax perspective, what distinguishes corporations from other
investment entities is that corporations are taxed separately from their
investors. 35 The corporate income tax is assessed on the corporation's
income and the liability is paid out of corporate assets. Corporate
income is not included on the investor's return and corporate taxes
are not considered to be paid by the individual investor.36 Accordingly, because corporations are separ-ately taxed entities, the corpoDharmapala, Investor Taxation in Open Economies (2009) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.columbia.edu/null/download?&exclusive=filemgr.download&
file_id=162914 (last visited Sept. 14, 2010). I subsequently applied the after-tax CAPM to
examine how tax policy affects the competition between sovereign wealth funds and private investors for different investments. Knoll, Sovereign Wealth Funds, note 11, at 7-17.
33 I make this argument in Knoll, Taxes and Competitiveness, note 11, at 12-17, and
apply it in Knoll, UBIT, note 11, at 6-12, and Knoll, Sovereign Wealth Funds, note 11, at 79.
34 When the entity is taxed, but the income earned and the taxes paid by the entity are
attributable to the investor or are creditable as with the indirect foreign tax credit, IRC
§§ 902, 960, then the entity is effectively an untaxed pass-through entity for tax purposes.
35 In the tax literature, this is referred to as a classic corporate income tax. Corporate
income is taxed twice: once at the level of the individual and then again at the level of the
investor. IRC §§ 1, 11, 61.
36 Some jurisdictions integrate the corporate and individual taxes. There are two basic
ways to do this. If the investor is exempt, tax is assessed at the corporate leveL If the
investors receive a tax credit for the tax paid by the corporation, then the tax is effectively
assessed at the investor leveL
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rate income tax operates as a toll charge on investments made through
corporations.37 Thus, when the toll charge differs across companies
(because tax rates differ), the corporate income tax affects competitiveness. Companies that pay a higher effective corporate income tax
rate than their competitors are at a tax-induced disadvantage in competitiveness, and conversely. In effect, the higher tax rate raises the
company's hurdle rate on new investments. That is because the
before-tax return on the investment pays both the corporate tax and
the investor, who presumably requires the same after-tax return regardless of the entity through which the investment is made. Thus, a
higher corporate tax burden directly translates into a higher hurdle
rate for investments.
As a result, the effect of the corporate income tax on competitiveness depends upon where income arises. 38 For investments that produce income in the United States, the U.S. corporate income tax is
assessed on that income whether the parent corporation is a U.S. or a
foreign corporation.39 Thus, when it comes to acquiring productive
assets in the United States, the U.S. corporate income tax does not
disadvantage U.S.-based firms relative to their foreign-based rivals. 40
That is so even when the U.S. corporate income tax rate exceeds foreign rates.
For investments that produce income outside of the United States,
however, the U.S. corporate income tax disadvantages U.S.-based corporations relative to their foreign-based counterparts. 41 Because the
United States taxes U.S.-based corporations on their worldwide income, U.S. corporations pay U.S. tax on their foreign source income. 42
37 I make this argument in Knoll, Business Taxes, note 11, at 11-12, and Knoll, Taxes and
Competitiveness, note 11, at 18-19. A similar argument is made by Devereux, note 28.
38 There are elaborate and complex source rules that determine what jurisdiction has the
primary right to tax a given income stream.
39 IRC § 11, 881(a), 882(a).
40 The discussion in the text ignores any difference in the ability of U.S.-based and foreign-based companies to set internal transfer prices in a manner that reduces taxes. For an
introduction to transfer pricing, see Brian J. Arnold & Michael J. Mcintyre, International
Tax Primer ch. 4 (2d ed. 2002).
41 Foreign and domestic investments are widely assumed to be substitutes. There is,
however, some evidence that they are complements. See Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley &
James R. Hines, Jr., Domestic Effects of the Foreign Activities of US Multinationals 5
(Div. of Research, Harvard Bus. School, Working Paper, 2008), available at http://www.
people.hbs.edu/ffoley/fdidomestic.pdf. That is to say, more efficient firms invest more everywhere. If that is right, the U.S. reliance on a worldwide corporate income tax will disadvantage U.S. firms not only with respect to their foreign investments, but also will
disadvantage them with respect to their domestic investments.
42 IRC § 11 (not limiting taxable corporate income to U.S. source income). Although
the United States is often said to come closer to a pure worldwide tax system than almost
any other country, the U.S. tax system falls short of that ideal by not having an unlimited
foreign tax credit and by deferring taxation on some classes of foreign income.
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To avoid double taxation, U.S. taxpayers receive a foreign tax credit
(FTC) for taxes ·paid to foreign governments on their U.S. source income.43 That credit, however, is limited to the U.S. tax that would
have been paid on that income. 44 Thus, when it comes to making investments in overseas assets, the U.S. corporate income tax imposes
an additional or incremental tax. 45 That tax disadvantages U.S. corporations relative to foreign corporations that do not pay any additional
tax on their foreign source income.46
In general, the disadvantage that a U.S.-based corporation faces
abroad is greater the lower the tax rate imposed by the host jurisdiction relative to the rate imposed by the United States.47 Thus, the
disadvantage is likely to be large when the host jurisdiction uses tax
incentives to attract foreign investment. When offered to U.S.-based
corporations, such incentives ultimately will end up in the U.S. treasury. In contrast, when offered to foreign-based corporations that are
not taxed on a worldwide basis, those tax incentives will likely red~mnd to the benefit of the recipient firms. 48
As suggested immediately above, the disadvantage U.S.-based
MNCs face in the competition to acquire foreign assets is not inherent
in the corporate income tax. Instead, the disadvantage is a result of
the United States taxing the worldwide income of U.S.-based corporations. Many countries do not tax their domestic corporations' worldwide income, choosing instead to tax only the income earned within
the jurisdiction. Jurisdictions that do not tax the foreign source income of their residents and domestically-based corporations are said
to employ a source-based or a territorial tax system. It follows that if
the United States were to adopt a territorial tax system and stop taxIRC § 901.
IRC § 904.
45 Under some circumstances, U.S.-based corporations will have an advantage in the
competition to acquire foreign assets. Specifically, when the U.S. corporate tax rate is
below the foreign corporate tax rate and the foreign taxes are fully creditable in the United
States, then U.S.-based finns will value the assets more highly than domestic frrms. In
effect, the toll charge bas become a subsidy. See J. Clifton Heming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni &
Stephen E. Shay, Some Perspectives from the United States on the Worldwide Taxation vs.
Territorial Taxation Debate, 3 J. of Australasian Teachers Assn. 35, 35-36 (2008), available
at http://www.atax.unsw.edu.au/atta/jatta/jattavol3no2/l_jatta_vol3_no2.pdf.
46 Deferral reduces but does not eliminate that disadvantage. Moreover, because of the
possibility of using FfCs earned in one country to offset tax on the income earned in
another country, it therefore follows that for any specific investment the U.S. corporation
might have either an advantage or disadvantage relative to foreign competitors. It is, however, likely because the United States collects revenue on foreign source income that on
average U.S. corporations are disadvantaged by the corporate income tax. Moreover, the
enactment of any proposals that would reduce deferral would reduce the competitiveness
of U.S.-based MNCs abroad.
47 See Knoll, Tax Sparing, note 11, at 11-17.
48 Id. at 9.
43
44
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ing the foreign source income of U.S. corporations, it could eliminate
the disadvantage described above. In such circumstances, the U.S.
corporate income tax would no longer operate as a toll charge on U.S.
corporations investing abroad. 49
The United States does not have to go as far as adopting a pure
territorial tax system in order to eliminate the disadvantage faced by
U.S. corporations. No country uses either a pure worldwide or a pure
territorial tax system; most countries use hybrid tax systems that combine elements of both systems.50 Many countries employ a hybrid that
taxes active income on a territorial basis and passive income on a
worldwide or residence basis. In practice, such an approach often results in taxing corporate income at source and individual income at
the investor's residence. 51 Accordingly, if the United States were to
adopt such a hybrid, the U.S. corporate income tax would not operate
as a toll charge on foreign source income and U.S.-based corporations
would not be disadvantaged when investing overseas.52
The Obama Administration, however, is not trying to move the U.S.
international tax system into closer alignment with those of our major
trading partners. Instead, the Administration says that it wants to
tighten worldwide taxation by reducing deferral, which would move
our international tax system further away from those of our trading
partners. 53 If enacted and enforced, such a policy would increase the
toll charge from making overseas investments through U.S. compa-

4 9 Fleming et a!., note 45, at 36-37. The logic for taxing passive income on a residence
basis is that such income has no clear source and can easily be made to seem to have
whatever source is desired. Accordingly, most countries with territorial tax systems tax
passive income on a residence basis. See Hugh J. Ault & Brian J. Arnold, Comparative
Income Taxation: A Structural Analysis 372-75, 378 (2d ed. 2004); Fleming et al., note 45,
at 85.
50 Fleming et al., note 45, at 36-37.
51 See Reuven Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law 11-13 (2007).
52 See Knoll, Business Taxes, note 11, at 18-19. The analysis is different and simpler
when the entity is not taxed, but is instead treated as a pass-through entity. (An entity can
be a pass-through because the entity is not taxed or because the investor includes entity
income on his personal return and treats the entity's tax liability as a tax payment on his
own behalf. In the United States, partnerships, limited liability companies (LLCs), and S
corporations are examples of the first type of pass-through. The indirect FTC, which in the
United States only applies when a U.S. corporation owns at least 10% of the stock of a
foreign corporation from which it has received a dividend, is an example of the second.)
See IRC § 701, 902(a), 1363(a); Reg. § 301.7701-Z(c), -3(b). In that case, the individual
investor's tax rate is the only relevant tax rate. Moreover, differences in relative tax rates
do not distort ownership as long as tax rates are equal across investments.
53 See Robert Carroll, The Importance of Tax Deferral and a Lower Corporate Tax Rate
(Tax Found., Spec. Rep. No. 174, Feb. 2010), available at http://www.taxfoundation.org/
files/sr174.pdf.
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nies, thereby further reducing the competitiveness of U.S.-incorporated MNCs. 54
IV.

TAXES AND THE COMPETITIVENESS OF DOMESTIC PRODUCTION

The corporate income tax also affects competitiveness when the domestic industry is defined by the productive activity located within
that nation. Under the second definition of a domestic industry, the
U.S. auto industry comprises all of the automobile-producing activity
that occurs in the United States without regard to where the corporations performing that activity are based. As described above, such a
domestic industry is competitive if it attracts large amounts of capital.55 Taxation, then, can hinder the competitiveness of such an industry by discouraging local investment.
In order to understand how the corporate income tax discourages
investment in U.S. automobile production, consider an automotive investment that will be made in either the United States or Europe, but
- not in both places. The investment might be the plant where a new
fuel-efficient automobile to be sold in Asia is produced. If the investment is made in the United States, whether by a U.S.- or a foreignbased corporation, the United States collects corporate income tax on
the income that arises in the United States. 56 If, however, the investment takes place in Europe, the United States does not collect any
corporate tax on that income. Instead, the European jurisdiction
where the investment is made will collect any corporate tax on that
income. Thus, if the U.S. corporate income tax rate exceeds the corporate income tax rate in the alternative European jurisdiction, then
the U.S. corporate income tax will reduce the return from making an
investment in the United States relative to the return from making the
same investment in Europe. 57 That, in tum, will increase the mini54 The discussion in the text assumes that the tax residence of a corporation is fixed. In
effect, residence is an historical artifact that it is not practical to change because of various
rules and provisions, such as the U.S. anti-inversion provisions. See IRC § 7874; Reg.
§ 1.7874-1; Temp. Reg.§ 1.7874-lT, -2T. The opposite pole from the position assumed in
the text is to assume that a corporation can reside anywhere. If the choice of corporate
residence is purely elective and has no consequences other than tax, then presumably all
companies will choose the tax home associated with the lowest total tax cost. Competition
among states, then, can be expected to push the residence state tax bite close to zero. An
intermediate position is to assume that residence follows real world activity. In that case,
small economic changes that result in a change in residence could have large tax consequences. In other words, the tax costs and benefits of certain small changes can be large,
which means that such changes can have large implicit tax costs or subsidies.
55 See discussion in Part II.
56 See IRC §§ 11, 882.
57 More generally, the relevant tax rate is not just the corporate tax rate. The relevant
rate is the incremental rate on the capital income that is collected when the investment
occurs in the United States instead of Europe.
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mum required rate of return ("hurdle rate") for such an investment in
the United States relative to the hurdle rate for such an investment in
Europe. Therefore, if the U.S. corporate income tax rate exceeds the
European rate, then the U.S. corporate income tax will discourage investment in the United States in favor of investment in Europe. 58
Although the investment-dampening effect of the corporate income
tax is easiest to see when the output is sold in a third jurisdiction, the
same logic applies when the output is sold in one of the jurisdictions
where the investment can be made. Longstanding income tax principles call for the division of total income into the income from production and the income from sale. 59 The income from sale typically arises
in the importing jurisdiction, whereas the income from production
typically arises where production occurs. Thus, a corporate income
tax, by raising the hurdle rate for investment in the taxing jurisdiction,
drives capital investment toward other jurisdictions.60 Hence, the second way that the U.S. corporate income tax harms the competitiveness of U.S. industries is by discouraging investment in productive
activities in the United States in favor of investment elsewhere. 61
In contrast with the ownership-based definition of the U.S. auto industry (where a worldwide corporate income tax harms competitiveness, but a territorial tax does not), under the location-based
definition, both territorial and worldwide corporate income taxes
harm competitiveness. That a territorial corporate income tax harms
competitiveness is easiest to see when every jurisdiction has such a
tax. In that case, the income is taxed-at least in part-where investment occurs. Higher tax rates lead to less investment. It is also easy
to see that the investment-dampening effect of the corporate income
58 Throughout this Article, I assume that tax rates are the same across industries so that
all investments subject to a specific tax regime are taxed at the same rate. If tax rates differ
across investments, the location of specific investments can be affected through the impact
on input prices.
59 Income is not apportioned among countries, but instead the income arising in each
country is taxed first by that country. Other countries through which that income might
pass have only a secondary right to tax that income.
60 This principle has long been recognized in the international tax literature. See Richman, note 6, at 8-9, 90-94; Musgrave, note 6, at 72-73.
61 The corporate income tax is not the only tax that discourages domestic production.
The individual income tax has the same effect so long as individuals and noncorporate
entities (such as partnerships, LLCs, and S corporations) are engaged in capital-intensive
productive activities that can move offshore. In such circumstances, the U.S. income tax
will raise the hurdle rate on investments in the United States. That, in turn, will discourage
investment in the United States, thereby driving such investment abroad. Thus, the detrimental effect of income taxation on production in the United States is broader than the
corporate income tax. Moreover, the deleterious effects of the individual income tax on
local production can be cured by global adoption of worldwide individual taxaxtion with
unlimited FTCs. Absent such coordination, countries with high tax rates will be disadvantaged in the competition to attract investment.
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tax does not arise when the entity is not separately taxed-that is to
say, when the entity is a pass-through entity-and the investor is subject to worldwide taxation (with unlimited FTCs). In that case, all
income is taxed at the level of the investor. Assuming that the investor is taxed at the samerate (at the margin) on all income, then the
individual's tax liability is not sensitive to the location where income_ is
earned, which in turn implies that taxation does not distort location.
The location-distorting effects of the corporate income tax are
harder to see, but generally persist, when corporate entities are taxed
on a worldwide basis. As described above, if all jurisdictions provide
an unlimited FTC, then all investors have an incentive to invest
through entities located in the jurisdiction with the lowest corporate
income tax rate. 62 In such circumstances, the marginal corporate tax
rate on any investment is independent of the location where the investment occurs. Instead, the marginal corporate tax rate on every
corporate investment is the corporate tax rate assessed by the jurisdiction where all corporations are based. In theory, such a tax system
can be locationally neutral because the effective tax rate on all corporate investments is the same.6 3
In practice, however, worldwide corporate taxation is very unlikely
to lead to locational neutrality. No country is likely to emerge as the
consensus choice for corporate tax home because no country would
likely be willing to make the financial sacrifice that would be necessary to ensure locational neutrality. 64 A low-tax country that attracts
foreign corporations would have to rebate the difference in taxes paid
on investments "in jurisdictions with higher tax rates. 65 The cost to any
jurisdiction of such an open-ended policy could be immense. Instead,
countries with worldwide tax systems tend to limit FTCs to taxes paid
abroad and do not provide refunds. That limitation gives effect to
local tax rate differences and distorts the location of investment.
62 The discussion in the text assumes that all countries tax corporations and their investors separately and that all countries provide both corporations and investors with unlimited FTCs.
63 Corporate investments might not all be channeled through the jurisdiction with the
lowest corporate income tax rate. Nontax issues, such as corporate governance practices,
corporate law, and securities laws, can affect the decision where corporate parents are
based. In that case, if all investors invest through corporations in the same jurisdiction,
then locational neutrality will occur. If, however, parent corporations are located in more
than one jurisdiction with different tax rates, then locational neutrality will not be
achieved.
64 In a traditional worldwide tax system, the country levies the same tax on domestic
activity within the country and on the foreign source income of domestic residents. Fleming et a!., note 45, at 35-36.
65 Of course, low-tax countries looking to attract corporations have no incentive to provide such refunds. Typically, they employ territorial taxation.
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It is also common, although the United States does not currently do
this, to restrict the use of FfCs so that excess FfCs from high-tax
countries cannot be used to offset taxes owed on the income earned in
low-tax countries. (Moreover, the proponents of worldwide taxation
generally favor a country-by-country limitation on the FfC. 66 ) The
use of such country-by-country FfC limitations gives greater effect to
cross-border differences in tax rates, thereby undercutting locational
neutrality. Under such circumstances, worldwide corporate income
taxation would raise the tax rate on low-taxed income to the home
country level, but it would not reduce the tax on any income taxed at a
rate above the home country level. Thus, to the extent that corporations can choose their tax homes, the incentive to select low-tax jurisdictions remains and so there will be little tax collected at home. As a
result, local tax rates will be determinative: They will affect location
and there will not be locational neutrality.
Alternatively, assume that the choice of tax home is not elective,
but closely follows the location of specific assets. In that case, the
effective tax on locating those assets in a jurisdiction is not only the
tax assessed on the income produced by those assets, but also includes
any other income that is taxed in the home jurisdiction by virtue of
locating those assets in that jurisdiction. Thus, local tax rates will affect the location of investment and the tax system will not be locationally neutral.
In sum, it is uncertain what, if anything, worldwide taxation at the
corporate level does to promote locational neutrality. In contrast with
worldwide taxation at the investor level, where the mechanism for
achieving locational neutrality is clear (although the conditions are
strict-including universal adoption of worldwide taxation with unlimited FTCs and investors with fixed locations-and there can be a high
cost to the residence jurisdiction of adopting such a tax system), with
corporate taxation it is not clear what is the mechanism whereby
worldwide taxation will help to achieve locational neutrality.67 Expressed more succinctly, the case for worldwide corporate taxation as
a method of achieving locational neutrality is highly questionable and
remains to be made. It cannot and should not be presumed from a
simple analogy to taxation of the individual investor.
As the discussion above suggests, the disadvantage that the U.S. automotive industry-defined as the production of automobiles within the
United States-suffers as a result of the U.S. corporate income tax is
See, e.g., Fleming et al., note 45, at 36.
Moreover, in a few special cases where a mechanism is specified, the conditions required for that mechanism to achieve locational neutrality are likely to be very strict (even
stricter than they are for individual taxation) and very unlikely to occur.
66
67
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not a function of the scope of that tax-whether it is territorial or
worldwide-but rather is a function of the U.S. corporate income tax
rate relative to corporate income tax rates in other jurisdictions. It,
thus, follows that the United States can unilaterally improve its competitiveness by reducing its corporate income tax rate. 68 The obvious
cost of such a policy to the U.S. government is a loss in revenue. 69 In
light of the United States' current fiscal condition, the lost revenue
would have to be replaced.7°
It follows from the discussion in the last two Parts that it is possible
for the corporate income tax to produce both types of harmful effects
at the same time. A U.S. worldwide corporate income tax will operate
as a toll charge on overseas corporate investments by U.S. MNCs,
thereby disadvantaging U.S.-based MNCs relative to their foreign
competitors. In addition, if the U.S. corporate income tax rate exceeds the rate in many other countries with which the United States
competes for investment, then the high U.S. corporate income tax rate
will also discourage corporate investment in the United States. Because the above is a reasonably accurate description of current corporate income tax practices in the United States and the rest of the
world, there is good reason to believe that the U.S. corporate income
tax discourages production both by U.S. firms and in the United
States.

68 The United States would enhance its competitiveness by reducing other taxes on corporate income, such as the taxes on dividends and capital gains (from sales of shares).
69 Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Simple, Fair and Competitive
Tax Plan for the United States 121, 124 (2008); see also IRS, Gross Collections, by Type of
Tax, Fiscal Years 1960-2009, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/09db06co.xls (last visited Aug.
25, 2010) (showing business income tax gross collections of $354 billion in fiscal year 2008
and $225 billion in fiscal year 2009).
70 There is another caveat for proponents of worldwide corporate taxation. As described in the last Part, the United States can improve the competitiveness of U.S.-based
MNCs without lowering its corporate income tax rate by unilaterally moving to a territorial
tax system. Although the United States can unilaterally reduce the disadvantage to production in the United States by reducing the U.S. corporate tax rate, it cannot reduce that
disadvantage by moving closer to a worldwide tax system. The source of the disadvantage
is not that the United States does not have a pure worldwide system tax, but is instead that
other countries from which investment in the United States comes do not have pure worldwide corporate income tax systems. Reducing the disadvantage to U.S. production without
lowering U.S. tax rates (or raising foreign tax rates) requires other countries to move towards worldwide taxation-and that is not likely to happen. Indeed, the trend is away
from worldwide taxation to the hybrid system described earlier. See text accompanying
notes 50-51. Moreover, the movement must be such that all corporations are taxed on a
worldwide basis on all of their investments so that local tax rates are not binding.
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A

DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION OF How THE CoRPORATE
INCOME

TAX

AFFECTS COMPETITIVENESS

In the last two Parts, I described how the corporate income tax affects competitiveness. I showed that the impact of the corporate income tax on competitiveness and the mechanism through which the
tax affects competitiveness depends upon how the domestic industry is
defined. In this Part, I express the impact of the corporate income tax
on competitiveness diagrammatically.
An example and some notation will be helpful. Consider a simple
world with only two jurisdictions-the European Union and the
United States. Denote the before-tax rate of return by R and the U.S.
corporate income tax rate by t. 71 The EU jurisdiction is assumed not
to have a corporate income tax. The subscripts EU and US denote
whether an asset is located in the European Union or the United
States and the same superscripts denote whether the asset is owned by
an EU or U.S. corporation.
FIGURE

2

GRAPHICAL DEPICTION oF How CoRPORATE INCOME

TAX

HURTS COMPETITIVENESS
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71 In practice, one would want to use the effective marginal tax rate-the present value
of additional taxes paid on an incremental dollar of income-and not the statutory tax rate.
For a discussion of effective marginal tax rates, see Myron S. Scholes, Mark A. Wolfson,
Merle Erickson, Edward L. Maydew & Terry Shevlin, Taxes and Business Strategy 186 (3d
ed. 2005).
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Let the vertical axis in Figure 2 represent where productive assets
are most efficiently located. The bottom of Figure 2 represents those
assets where the efficiency advantage from locating in the United
States is greatest. At the top are those assets where the efficiency
advantage from locating in the European Union is greatest. The horizontal solid line represents the point where there is no efficiency gain
from locating the asset in either the United States or the European
Union. 72 Accordingly, if there are no distortions affecting the location
of assets, then all assets above the horizontal solid line are located in
the European Union and all assets below that line are located in the
United States.
Let the horizontal axis represent who most productively owns various assets. On the far left are those assets for which the productivity
advantage from U.S. ownership is greatest. On the far right are those
assets for which the productivity advantage from EU ownership is
greatest. The solid vertical line represents those assets for which U.S.
and EU ownership are equally productiveJ3 Accordingly, if there are
no distortions affecting the ownership of assets, then all assets to the
right of the solid vertical line are EU-owned and all assets to the left
of that line are U.S.-owned.
Figure 2, thus, contains four quadrants, labeled 1 through 4, where
each quadrant represents a different combination of efficient location
and ownership. The bottom left quadrant (quadrant 1) contains assets
that are efficiently located in the United States and U.S.-owned. 74
The bottom right quadrant (quadrant 2) contains assets that are efficiently located in the United States and EU-owned.75 The top left
quadrant (quadrant 3) contains assets that are efficiently located in
the European Union and U.S.-owned.76 Finally, the top right quadrant (quadrant 4) contains assets that are efficiently located in the European Union and EU-owned.77 If taxation does not distort the
location and ownership of assets, then all productive assets will be located where they are most efficiently located and owned by their most
efficient owner.78
That is to say, Rus = Rw. Below that line, Rus > Rw, and above that line, Rus < REv·
Thus, at the line, Rus = Rw. To the left of that line, Rus > Rw, and to the right of that
line, Rus < Rw.
74 In the bottom left quadrant, Rusus > Rwus, Rusw, REuEV·
75 In the bottom right quadrant, REV us> Ru5us, Rus £u, REVEU·
76 In the top left quadrant, Ru5w > Rwus, Rusus, REuw.
77 In the top right quadrant, REVEu > Rwus, Rusw, Rusus·
78 The analysis and discussion in the text do not distinguish among different owners
from the same country. In other words, it is implicitly assumed that all potential owners
from any country are taxed the same. If different owners are taxed at different rates, then
the analysis is more complicated and the distortions are likely to be even greater.
12

73
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Figure 2 also can be used to illustrate the two different definitions
of the U.S. automobile industry. Under an ownership-based definition, the U.S. auto industry is the total production of U.S.-based manufacturers. In Figure 2, this definition is represented by quadrants 1
and 3. Similarly, the ownership-based EU automobile industry is represented by quadrants 2 and 4. Under a location-based definition, the
U.S. auto industry is the production of automobiles in the United
States by both U.S.-based and foreign-based auto producers. This
definition is represented in Figure 2 by quadrants 1 and 2. Similarly,
the location-based EU auto industry is represented by quadrants 3
and 4.
Figure 2, then, can be used to describe how the U.S. corporate income tax affects U.S. competitiveness. As described in the text above,
the tax will raise the before-tax rate of return in the United States
relative to that in the European Union. That effect is represented by
the horizontal dashed line that lies below the horizontal solid line.
Accordingly, the assets represented by the area between the two horizontal lines are the assets most efficiently located in the United States,
but which as a result of the United States imposing a corporate income tax are located in the European Union. Those assets are indicated by the area marked by the letters A, B, and C.
Furthermor~, the size of the area labeled A, B, and C depends upon
the U.S. corporate income tax rate.7 9 The higher the U.S. tax rate, the
larger is the area labeled A, B, and C. As the U.S. tax rate decreases,
this area gets smaller. When the EU and U.S. tax rates are equal, then
taxation has not dislocated any investments. If, however, U.S. tax
rates are below EU tax rates, then the dashed line is above the solid
line and taxation shifts assets from the European Union to the United
States. As the discussion above makes clear, location depends upon
relative tax rates. If tax rates are the same across locations, then taxes
do not affect location. If they differ, then taxation encourages invest-

79 Because investors keep only their after-tax return, equilibrium requires that the aftertax rate of return on assets in the United States and in the European Union is equal. If
that condition is violated, then investors will shift capital from one jurisdiction to another
until the after-tax rate of return is equal across jurisdictions. Assuming that the United
States does not tax the EU income of U.S.-based MNCs, the after-tax rate of return of
corporate capital in the United States equals the before-tax rate of return in the European
Union. That is to say, in equilibrium, RusU - t) = REu· Thus, assets that are more productive in the United States than in the European Union, but are not sufficiently more productive in the United States to cover the U.S. tax (that is to say, REul(l - t) > Rus > REu), will
migrate from the United States to the European Union. The higher the U.S. corporate
income tax rate, the greater the migration.
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ment in low-tax jurisdictions and discourages it in high-tax
jurisdictions.80
As described in the text above, one effect of the United States enacting a corporate income tax, assuming that the tax is assessed on a
worldwide basis, is to impose a toll charge on U.S. companies that
invest abroad. 81 In the example, the toll charge will raise the hurdle
rate for investments by U.S. corporations in the European Union.
That, in turn, will bring about a shift from U.S. to EU ownership of
those investments where the productivity advantage from U.S. ownership is insufficient to compensate for the higher hurdle rate brought
about by the corporate income tax.s2
That effect is illustrated in Figure 2 by the vertical dashed line,
which only goes down as far as the horizontal dashed line. The vertical dashed line, which indicates changes in ownership, does not extend
below the horizontal dashed line because the toll charge only impacts
investments by U.S. corporations abroad. It does not affect the domestic investments of U.S. corporations. Thus, those assets represented by the area above the horizontal dashed line and to the right of
the vertical dashed line are located in the European Union and EUowned. Assets above the horizontal dashed line and to the left of the
vertical dashed line are assets located in the European Union and
U.S.-owned. Accordingly, the assets for which ownership is shifted
are those assets represented by the area between the two vertical
lines. Those assets are indicated by the area marked by the letters B
and D.
Analogously to the situation with location, the size of the area labeled B and D depends upon the U.S. corporate income tax rate.
That can be seen as follows. Equilibrium requires that the after-tax
rate of return on U.S.-owned and EU-owned assets is equal at the
margin. For assets located in the European Union that implies that at
the margin the after-tax rate of return on capital owned by a U.S.based MNC equals the before-tax rate of return on capital owned by
80 So long as the United States is a small country in the world capital market, the distribution of assets between the United States and the European Union does not depend on
whether the United States has a territorial or worldwide tax system. That is to say, if the
United States is a price taker in global markets, then market rates of return do not depend
on whether the United States taxes or exempts its residents on their overseas income. In
terms of Figure 2, that implies that REU and Rus are independent of whether the United
States taxes or exempts its residents on their non-U.S. income. It thus follows that so long
as the United States is a price taker in global capital markets, that the location of assets
does not depend on whether the United States adopts territorial or worldwide taxation.
81 See discussion in Part III.
82 Tightening worldwide taxation (for example, by reducing the opportunity for deferral) discourages U.S. corporations from holding overseas assets by raising the toll charge
on investments through U.S. companies. See Knoll, Taxes and Competitiveness, note 11,
at 34-36.
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an EU-based corporation.83 Thus, the adoption by the United States
of a corporate income tax will cause assets located in the European
Union that are more productive in U.S. hands than in EU hands (but
are not sufficiently more productive in U.S. hands to cover the tax84)
to migrate from U.S. to EU ownership. Once again, the higher the
U.S. tax rate, the greater the migration.
That migration can be stopped Without reducing the statutory U.S.
corporate income tax by the United States unilaterally moving from
worldwide taxation to territorial taxation. If the United States were
to adopt territorial taxation, then EU-based and U.S.-based firms
would pay the same tax (assumed to be zero in the example) when
they invested in the European Union. There would be, then, no toll
charge on overseas corporate investment. In terms of Figure 2, when
the U.S. corporate income tax rate on overseas investment is zero (t =
0), then the dashed vertical line separating U.S.- and EU-owned assets (Ru5 (1 - t) = Rw) sits exactly on top of the solid dotted line separating efficiently U.S.- and EU-owned assets (Rus = REu).
As described above, the current tax environment can be characterized as follows: The United States has a relatively high corporate income tax rate and the United States has a worldwide tax system for its
MNCs. Thus, the harm to U.S. competitiveness from the corporate
income tax is represented by the areas labeled A, B, C, and D. The
assets represented by those areas have had their location (A and C),
ownership (B) or both their location and ownership (D) shifted away
from the United States by the U.S. corporate income tax.
VI.

CoNCLUSION

Politicians, the press, and policy analysts regularly assert that high
corporate tax rates hurt U.S. competitiveness. Yet, in spite of their
frequent assertions that the corporate income tax hurts competitiveness, the connection between the corporate income tax and competi, tiveness has not been carefully spelled out. In this Article, I use the
U.S. automobile industry as an example in order to explore that
connection.
As described above, the corporate income tax directly harms the
competitiveness of the U.S. auto industry in one of two ways depending upon how the domestic auto industry is defined. 85 First, when the
, U.S. auto industry is defined in terms of the production of automoThat is to say, Ru5Eu (1- t) = Rww·
That is to say, RwEu (1 - t) > Ru5 w > RwEU·
85 The corporate income tax can also have indirect effects on U.S. competitiveness. The
analysis of such effects usually will entail a detailed analysis of the affected industry, including its use of specific tax provisions. In this Article, I look only at direct effects.
83

84
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biles that occurs within U.S. borders (without regard to where the corporations producing those cars are based), the corporate income tax,
by increasing the tax burden on U.S. source income raises the hurdle
rate on domestic investment. The higher hurdle nite discourages investment in the United States in favor of investment abroad. Second,
when each nation's auto industry is defined by the global production
of auto producers based in that nation (without regard to where production occurs), a worldwide corporate income tax operates as a toll
charge on a firm's foreign income-producing activities undertaken
abroad. Such a toll charge raises the hurdle rate on foreign direct
investment, which in turn discourages investment through the affected
corporation relative to investments made through untaxed or lowertaxed corporations from other countries. When excess credits from
income earned in one country can be used to offset excess income
earned in another, the toll charge can be a subsidy for some
investments.
Although most of the discussion and analysis in this Article focuses
on the impact of the corporate income tax on the U.S. automobile
industry, the methodology and the results are not confined to a single
industry or state or even to a single tax. There are several tax reform
proposals that their proponents advocate, at least in part, on the
grounds that they will improve U.S. competitiveness. 86 The framework developed in this Article for analyzing how the corporate income tax affects competitiveness can be applied to examine the
impact other existing taxes have and various tax reform proposals
would have on competitiveness. As this Article makes clear, although
it is a point that is often overlooked, how a tax affects the competitiveness of a domestic industry depends on whether the domestic industry
is defined as the production that takes place within a state regardless ·
of where the producers are based or as the total production of domestic-based producers both at home and abroad. The effects will often
differ and so it is important to be clear about how the domestic industry is defined.
When the debate over tax reform and tax rates heats up-and it
soon will-central issues in that debate will be what should happen to
the corporate income tax, how should the overseas income of U.S.
86 Among the most prominent of these proposals are: Graetz, note 68; Reuven S. AviYonah & Kimberly A. Clausing, A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment for Corporate Income Taxation: The Hamilton Project (Univ. of Michigan Law & Econ., Olin
Working Paper No. 07-009, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=995202); Edward D.
Kleinbard, Designing an Income Tax on Capital, in Taxing Capital Income 165 (Henry J.
Aaron, Leonard Burman & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 2007); The Presidential Advisory
Panel on Tax Reform, Final Report (Nov. 2005), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/
taxreformpanellfinal-report/index.html.
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corporations be taxed, and what tax rates need to be increased in order to raise revenue. A better understanding of the connections between taxes and competitiveness should raise the level of that debate
and that might even lead to a better tax system.

